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 Surrender Without Defeat:
 Afrikaners and the South African "Miracle55
 The future enters into us in order to transform itself
 in us long before it happens.
 ?Rainer Maria Rilke
 Letters to a Young Poet
 In South Africa the worst never happens.
 ?popular saying
 INTRODUCTION
 During the final months of the 1980s one of the last devel
 opments that pundits would have predicted for South
 Africa was that the ruling Afrikaner group would give up
 power more or less voluntarily, to be replaced by a stable, inclu
 sive democracy. Over the longer run the more common prediction
 for the country was that of a low-level insurgency ending in a full
 scale civil war and a racial conflagration. For the short to medium
 term most serious analysts anticipated power shifting from the
 existing Afrikaner monopoly to an Afrikaner-led, multiracial oli
 garchy ruling as coercively as the apartheid regime. In 1988, Ken
 Owen, a respected Liberal editor, commented on the white-black
 struggle: "Barring massive external intervention I would put my
 money on any alliance dominated by Afrikaners. They have the
 capacity to devastate the region and yet to survive"1
 The political supremacy enjoyed by Afrikaners as the 1990s
 broke was vast in proportion to their numbers. They formed just
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 over half of the white group but represented only 8 percent of a
 total population of 40 million. Outwardly there was no indication
 that they were prepared to abandon power or its spoils. The
 National Party (NP) as the instrument of Afrikaner ethnic mobili
 zation and of apartheid was then in its forty-second year of power,
 enjoying a safe majority in a parliament from which the black
 majority was excluded. Afrikaners were in a predominant position
 in the cabinet and controlled the top levels of the central state
 bureaucracy, the state television and radio, and the senior levels of
 the security forces. The Afrikaner advance into the private sector,
 which was dominated by white English-speakers, was progressing
 rapidly. In the late 1970s Afrikaner capital controlled less than 10
 percent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Ex
 change, but this figure increased to 20 percent by 1990. Manage
 rial positions in the parastatal sector remained largely an Afrikaner
 preserve.
 The NP government was far more responsive to Afrikaner lob
 bying than to representations from English big business or institu
 tions commanding the support of blacks, who constituted 70
 percent of the population. A study conducted in the mid-1980s
 fittingly described the South African state as a Boereplaas?liter
 ally an Afrikaner farm. Afrikaner students were alone in speaking
 approvingly and proprietorially of "our" government and "our"
 army.2 This army was considered to be more than a match for
 anything that any African state or liberation organization could
 offer. Conscripting all white males, the state could count on loyal
 foot soldiers, particularly among Afrikaners. Asked in 1989, a few
 months before the African National Congress (ANC) was unbanned,
 how they would respond to a government controlled by that
 movement, 44 percent of Afrikaner students (as opposed to 10
 percent of English-speaking white students) said they would resist
 physically, while a further 32 percent indicated that they would
 emigrate.3 Cabinet ministers gave no indication that they enter
 tained the idea of giving up power. A typical statement at the time
 was that of the most reformist of all ministers, Roedolf F. (Pik)
 Botha, who said in 1978 that power-sharing with blacks would
 not be accepted, "not now, not to-morrow, not in a hundred
 years."4Even worse was the statement "one man, one vote within
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 one political entity." This meant "destruction," a "sort of sui
 cide," which no nation in the world would be prepared to commit.
 This Afrikaner state was challenged on several fronts, but noth
 ing suggested its imminent demise. The state was being isolated by
 way of a dense mesh of sanctions; financial sanctions, taking the
 form of a refusal to roll over bank loans, made it all but impossible
 to attract new foreign investment or overcome the burden of a
 serious problem balancing payments. Nevertheless, trade sanc
 tions were being circumvented, albeit at a cost, as new markets
 outside Europe and the United States opened up. The economy
 was projected to continue to grow at a rate of 2 to 3 percent per
 year. While with brief exceptions the urban centers and white
 residential suburbs remained calm, the state was severely shaken
 by a series of civil protests bordering on insurrection in the segre
 gated black townships, leading first to the partial imposition of a
 state of emergency in 1985 and then to a nationwide one in 1986.
 The draconian emergency measures failed to stamp out all resis
 tance, but by and large stability had returned by the late 1980s. In
 1989 the leadership of the banned African National Congress,
 which spearheaded the struggle for black liberation, felt compelled
 to acknowledge to its cadres that it lacked the capacity to escalate
 the armed struggle in any significant way. Two years earlier
 Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the main black leader operating within the
 apartheid structures, had commented scathingly on the absence of
 any visible signs of the liberation struggle: "After 25 years of
 endeavor every bridge in the country is still intact. Every system of
 electricity and water supply is intact and there is not a single
 factory out of production because of revolutionary activity. The
 classical circumstances in which an armed struggle wins the day.. .are
 just not present in South Africa."5
 The ANC-led resistance also took the form of a mass-based
 popular revolt consisting of rent and service charge boycotts, po
 litical strikes and stay-aways, and marches and demonstrations.
 These forms of mass action, which took place during the 1980s
 and after the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, were far
 more successful in weakening regime morale than was the guerrilla
 struggle. But well-placed observers and leaders of the ANC struggle
 recognized that these actions would not defeat the regime. Chester
 Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State in the 1980s, declared in
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 a study published in 1992 that the resistance "had no hope of
 forcing the government to capitulate, but the government could no
 longer hope to regain the legitimacy it had lost in the 1980s."6
 This was confirmed by the ANC's chief strategist, Joe Slovo, who
 at a critical stage in the negotiations wrote in the ANC mouthpiece
 Mayibuye: "The enemy is not defeated."7 In November 1996
 Nelson Mandela spoke critically of "superficial" black journalists
 who "assume that we have defeated the whites on a battlefield and
 that the whites are now lying on the floor helpless and begging for
 mercy and that we can impose conditions on them."8
 Yet by the end of 1996, less than ten years after Buthelezi's
 comment, the Afrikaners had lost all formal political power. The
 ANC held 62 percent of the parliamentary seats as opposed to 20
 percent for the NP, the largest opposition party in a parliament
 that operated in the classic Westminster mode of majoritarianism.
 Having had its demand for a constitutionally entrenched, power
 sharing cabinet rejected, the NP had withdrawn from the Govern
 ment of National Unity in which the negotiating parties had agreed
 to participate for an interim period of five years, ending in 1999.
 At the senior levels of the bureaucracy and the state television and
 radio corporation, Afrikaner incumbents were rapidly replaced by
 ANC supporters, mostly blacks or Indians. While still headed by
 Afrikaners, the police and defense force showed every sign of
 being loyal to the new government and the constitution. A new
 economic advance was taking place, one spearheaded by two
 black companies financially backed by the largest Afrikaner con
 glomerate, Sanlam. The black share of companies on the
 Johannesburg Stock Exchange looked set to match soon or even
 surpass that of the Afrikaner.9
 ORTHODOXY AND REVISION
 These developments startled the world and prompted Nelson
 Mandela to refer to South Africa's transition as a "small miracle."
 The London Financial Times commented that the regime change
 was one of the most extraordinary political transformations of the
 twentieth century, where "the people have defied the logic of their
 past and broken all the rules of social theory."10 One of the most
 common theoretical assumptions was that a ruling ethnic minority
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 with a deep attachment to a "homeland" could neither be forced
 to give up power nor would it willingly do so. During the apart
 heid years these two propositions were recurring themes in the
 political writings of Alan Paton, novelist, foremost Liberal, and
 lifelong student of the Afrikaner mind. Paton was convinced that
 if attempts were made to force the Afrikaner to accept majority
 rule in a unitary state he "would rather be destroyed than yield."
 Yet Paton also believed that the Afrikaners could turn away from
 domination and choose what he termed "the common society"
 within a federal state. His latest biographer neatly captures the
 essence of his convictions on this issue. "[Change] would come
 about only when the Afrikaner leaders came to the realization that
 it must. He did not imagine that they would be forced from power
 by blacks, or that Liberals by some electoral ju-jitsu might take
 their place. The initiative, he believed, would remain with the
 Afrikaner until the Afrikaner chose to give it up."11
 When the Afrikaners did give up power in the first half of the
 1990s analysts tried hard to explain the unanticipated develop
 ment. One explanation, succumbing to what Bergson called "the
 illusion of retrospective determinism" (i.e., what actually hap
 pened had to happen), deems it to have been inevitable. In this
 vein a recent study of the NP concludes that the combination of
 external and internal pressures made it "virtually impossible" for
 the apartheid government to maintain its existing practices by late
 1989.12 A much stronger case can, however, be made for the view
 that under President P. W. Botha, who resigned for health reasons
 in 1989, or under several possible successors other than Frederik
 W. (F. W.) de Klerk, the NP could and would have dominated the
 country into the next century, introducing new but quite unwork
 able policies designed to keep Afrikaner control. The question is,
 why did the Afrikaner leadership not pursue this course?
 Some analysts embrace the explanations of what Walker Connor
 in a famous critique called the "nation-building school," which he
 contends generalizes on the basis of First World polities. Connor
 took issue with this school's central assumption that the well
 spring of ethnic discord is not identity needs but economic de
 mands, making it possible for ethnonational groups to be bought
 off if their material interests are guaranteed.13 Among analysts
 studying the Afrikaners' surrender of power there is no shortage of
This content downloaded from 196.42.99.24 on Wed, 20 Sep 2017 08:52:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 118 Hermann Giliomee
 those who believe that consumerism saved South Africa. One
 commentator wrote, "[We] avoided a civil war [because] many
 whites were presented with a choice between their political power
 and their consumer goods?and quickly chose the latter."14 In a
 similar vein a sociological analysis states, "It yet has to be proven
 anywhere that a BMW-owning bureaucratic bourgeoisie with swim
 ming pools and servants readily sacrifices the good life for psycho
 logically gratifying ethnic affinities."15 This ignores the fact that
 perhaps 90 percent of Afrikaners were not in this class and that
 more than four-fifths of Afrikaners in polls taken in the 1980s
 indicated that they believed that the income and living standards
 of whites under black majority rule would suffer. In August 1992,
 when it began to be clear that the ANC would dominate the next
 government, two-thirds of whites were "not at all convinced" that
 their pensions or savings were safe under a new government,
 against only 12 percent who were.16 If the NP's constituency, as
 distinct from its negotiators, was so alarmed about its material
 prospects, the question that needs to be answered is not whether
 we are dealing with an effete bourgeoisie but why whites allowed
 their representatives to put their future at risk.
 A third explanation explores the possibility that the Afrikaner
 surrender was the result not so much of rampant consumerism but
 of an ideological collapse. According to this view, there was an
 inherent weakness in the NP's "culture of domination" and a
 singular lack of moral authority when confronted by a confident
 ANC leadership extolling human rights and non-racialism?posi
 tions all backed by the Western world that the Afrikaners took as
 their frame of reference.17 Again the question is: if it was inher
 ently so weak, why did apartheid, as one of the world's most hated
 systems, last so long? Why were Botha and others prepared to
 prolong it well beyond 1994?
 Finally, one can note a fourth explanation. This argues that the
 NP simply miscalculated in the negotiations and constitution
 making process, which stretched from February 1990 to December
 1996. Whereas de Klerk at one stage had openly expressed his
 conviction that the NP would "have its hands on the tiller for
 many years to come,"18 he was reduced at the end of the process
 to a position of haggling over the perks that would go with the job
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 of being the official leader of the opposition in a one-party domi
 nant system.
 This essay will align itself more closely with the latter two
 explanations but will discuss the themes and questions within the
 broader context of the Afrikaner mobilization and its ideology of
 ethnic survival. The basic argument is that, just as apartheid was
 based on the idea that it could ensure Afrikaner ethnic survival,
 the regime change of 1994 was brought about not so much by
 middle-class interests superseding the emotional identification in
 Afrikaner thinking but by the belief that apartheid could no longer
 be sustained by a shrinking white minority. Once the apartheid
 idea had collapsed there was no alternative ideology that could
 justify Afrikaner or white supremacy or even significant minority
 protection as distinct from individual rights.
 CONFRONTING THE ETHNIC SURVIVAL CRISES
 Early in the 1970s a sociologist and pollster in South Africa ob
 served that, because of popular myths and perceptions, significant
 proportions of whites in South Africa are oriented towards sur
 vival rather than domination and that the latter is an inevitable
 consequence of the former. He added that any analysis had to
 contend with what he called "gut-level fears and anxieties."19 The
 most prominent theme in Afrikaners' political thinking during the
 apartheid era was an obsession with the way in which the Afrikaners
 as a small nation could contend with different survival crises.
 Afrikaner nationalists commonly believed that survival in a hostile
 environment could only be secured if they kept the power that
 they had won in 1948. As an Afrikaner opponent of the NP
 leaders observed in 1959: "They regard it [political power] as an
 essential safeguard for their survival as a nation." Any threat to it
 "instantly calls for resistance which may be stirred to fanatic
 vehemence by the urge for national self-preservation."20
 At the most basic level there were Afrikaner fears about physical
 survival, which must be seen against a backdrop of a settler his
 tory, dating back to 1652, when a small Afrikaner population
 lived among great numbers of indigenous peoples in a vast terri
 tory. These fears and anxieties were not idiosyncratic. Explaining
 the unwillingness of Afrikaners to cede or share power, the histo
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 rian Lewis Gann wrote in 1959 that in societies in Africa, Eastern
 Europe, and Russia there is no underlying harmony on which a
 democracy could be built?only minorities with conflicting ideals,
 interests, fears, and grave anxieties. For dominant minorities mat
 ters like national identity and political self-determination are not
 mere abstractions, but a matter of life and death: they know that
 they can expect rough treatment once they become subject to a
 nationally distinct majority. As Gann observes: "This will espe
 cially be true if the minorities appear to be possessed of more than
 their fair share of economic wealth; then they are likely to be
 liquidated altogether."21 A thought very much along these lines
 was once expressed by the most respected Afrikaner poet and
 essayist, N. P. van Wyk Louw. He wrote that if the Afrikaners lost
 power and become a mere expatriate minority they would be "as
 helpless as the Jews in Germany."22
 The Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the mass evacuation of French
 settlers from Algeria, and the chaotic Belgian retreat from the
 Congo were all deeply unsettling to whites in South Africa. Afri
 kaans newspapers provided full and often lurid accounts of these
 traumatic events. Fear of an equally violent catastrophe lay close
 to the core of Afrikaner thought, giving rise to a series of draconian
 security laws. Liberals like Paton or Helen Suzman rightly criti
 cized these laws but made little effort to come to grips with the
 descent into disorder and despotism in many other African coun
 tries and the realistic fear that these developments could be repli
 cated at the tip of the continent. Despite the fact that not only the
 state but also private white citizens armed themselves, the fear did
 not subside. By 1987 four-fifths of Afrikaners stated in a national
 poll that under black majority rule the physical safety of whites
 would be threatened and white women would be molested.23 In
 1990, two months after negotiations started, 49 percent of whites
 agreed with the statement that there was reason to fear for their
 own safety and that of their family in the future; 43 percent felt
 otherwise.24
 Although fears about physical survival were not always openly
 expressed, concerns over white material survival were always promi
 nent in the public debate. As a result of their late urbanization
 Afrikaners struggled to make headway in the urban economy.
 When the NP came to power in 1948 about two-thirds of the
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 Afrikaners were comprised of blue collar and other manual work
 ers or struggling farmers who soon afterwards had to leave their
 land. Both classes needed state support to maintain themselves as
 part of the white dominant group. Apartheid was at heart an
 attempt to turn the white poor into a state-subsidized petty bour
 geoisie, properly housed and clothed, protected from black compe
 tition, and socialized in white supremacist behavior. This was not
 achieved overnight, and white South Africa retained a predomi
 nantly working class character for quite some time. Blue collar and
 other manual workers formed 50 percent of the employed white
 population in 1971 and 44 percent in 1983.25 The government
 could now proceed with more confidence in the field of industrial
 desegregation. In the meantime, however, increasing numbers of
 Afrikaners found employment in the state sector. By 1968, twice
 as many Afrikaners were in public-sector jobs than before 1948.
 Ten years later more than a third of Afrikaners were employed in
 this sector as compared to only a quarter of other whites. A great
 concentration of white middle-class workers in the state sector
 developed. By 1990, 46 percent of all white middle-class employ
 ment outside the primary sectors was in the state sector.
 It is sometimes argued that South Africa's democratization in
 the 1990s was made possible by the success of both apartheid and
 capitalism in turning the white electorate into an independent
 middle class with a diminishing need for the state. This perspective
 must be questioned. White state employees would inevitably be
 threatened by any shift to black majority rule. Furthermore, the
 distribution of wealth within white society had become quite un
 equal, with the top quintile controlling four-fifths of the wealth at
 the end of the 1970s. While the incomes of the top three quintiles
 in the white group had stagnated between 1975 and 1991, those of
 the lowest two had declined by a staggering 40 percent in the same
 period. These figures hardly present us with a profile of the white
 community as independently wealthy and able to prosper in the
 face of a hostile or indifferent black regime.26
 If political domination advanced white material interests, its
 longer-term effect on Afrikaner cultural survival was more am
 biguous. To paraphrase Milan Kundera on the Czech struggle,
 the fact that the Afrikaner people as a distinctive ethnic group has
 survived during the past century has less to do with political
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 cunning or armed force than with the huge intellectual effort that
 went into a small nation developing Afrikaans as a high-culture
 language, to use Ernest Gellner's term.27 Afrikaans originated in
 the first of two centuries of settlement as a Dutch-based vernacular
 spoken by settlers, slaves, and indigenous peoples. Turning away
 from both Dutch and English to build up Afrikaans constituted a
 choice, a project, or, to use Pascal's term, a wager. Originally
 branded a "kitchen language," Afrikaans was deliberately turned
 into a "white man's" or "civilized" language. Furthermore?and
 this was ultimately of paramount importance?the white Afrikaner
 nation came to see its distinctive identity as expressed by that
 language. In 1925 Afrikaans became an official language, and the
 Afrikaner nationalist movement now concentrated much of its
 efforts on ensuring that Afrikaans assumed an equal role alongside
 English as the medium of public discourse. A surprisingly vibrant
 literature soon developed, and Afrikaans took its place in science,
 technology, and the marketplace. In nationalist thinking, the people's
 very existence was manifested in the "living language" of Afri
 kaans.
 After the NP came to power in 1948, it enforced the principle of
 mother-tongue education at the school level, while five universities
 catered to Afrikaners on the tertiary level. The government con
 stantly emphasized the constitutional provision that Afrikaans and
 English be treated on an equal footing, but it used this provision
 flexibly in the schools. The fear gradually developed that the
 future of Afrikaans was in jeopardy if the subordinate population
 spurned it. When the government embarked on a massive exten
 sion in the provision of education to blacks in the early 1970s, it
 also attempted to impose the equality principle in black schools in
 townships around Johannesburg and other towns in the Transvaal
 province. It stipulated that all black pupils in these areas had to
 take Afrikaans as a subject and be taught mathematics and social
 science with Afrikaans as the only language of instruction. This
 was the fateful precipitant that caused the so-called Soweto Riots
 of 1976, by far the most serious black uprising by that point
 against apartheid.
 By now Afrikaans had widely become identified as the language
 of the oppressor?the medium used when policemen arrested blacks
 or when officials instructed blacks to show their "pass," which
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 was the most effective check on black urbanization. Black resis
 tance was expressed in a rejection of Afrikaans and Afrikaners.
 The more apartheid in its own terms "succeeded" by getting
 blacks to accept "self-government" in their own "homelands," the
 more Afrikaans as a language failed. One after another "home
 land" governments chose English and an indigenous language as
 their official languages. The future of Afrikaans was threatened
 from two sides. Its close association with domination was sitting
 like an albatross on its shoulder. At the same time, however, there
 was every prospect that a black government would elevate English
 to the status of being the sole official language, spelling the end of
 Afrikaans and the Afrikaans culture?and with it the demise of the
 Afrikaner people.28 The demographic picture was ominous. The
 best possible Afrikaner ally was the colored people, a predomi
 nantly Afrikaans-speaking group almost as large as the Afrikaners.
 Apartheid had alienated their elite, who were now turning to
 English. Whereas 18 percent of the South African people spoke
 Afrikaans as their mother tongue in 1970, only 15 percent was
 projected to do so in 2000.
 There was lastly also a question about the ethical quality of
 survival. Prominent intellectuals pursued the chimera of a just
 solution, or less ambitiously counseled against a patently unjust
 one, to the country's racial problem. The most eloquent and last
 ing contribution was a 1952 essay by van Wyk Louw, which
 analyzed the different survival crises that conceivably confronted a
 small people like the Afrikaners. These included military defeat,
 mass immigration, and absorption by an Anglo-Saxon or Bantu
 speaking (African) nation. For intellectuals, however, the greatest
 of these crises would occur "when a large number of our people
 comes to believe that we need not live together in justice [his
 emphasis] with other ethnic groups; when they come to believe
 that mere survival is the chief issue, not a just existence." Suc
 cumbing to this "final temptation" could have grave consequences
 since it could lead to a critical number of intellectuals withdrawing
 their allegiance (something Louw never did). Louw posed the
 question: "Is it possible for a small people to survive for long if it
 becomes hateful or something evil for the best in?or outside?its
 ranks?" He believed that it was possible for his people one day to
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 emerge from the "dark night of the soul" and say, "I would rather
 go down than survive in injustice."29
 A sociopolitical order and a justificatory framework were needed
 that dealt with the threats and challenges on all the different
 levels?political, physical, material, cultural, and ethical. Afrikaner
 nationalists believed they had found the answer in apartheid. This
 was not only an ideology but also an ethnic survival system that
 fostered and concealed Afrikaner domination. It was comprised of
 two parts: an ethnonationalism as the base and apartheid as a
 body of operating principles. The nationalist part of the system
 was an assembly of loosely formulated beliefs, values, and fears.
 On one level there was a special claim to the land based on the
 spurious assumption that the greatest part of the land was empty
 when the settlement was founded in the mid-seventeenth century.
 On another level the claim was made that Afrikaner political
 power and cultural identity rested on a covenant or contract with
 an all-knowing God.30 This was soon extended to an argument
 stressing the centrality of nations in God's creation and their God
 given separate destinies.
 A nationalist ideology, however, rarely has clear and coherent
 ideas about a proper political and social order. Apartheid devel
 oped as an action-related system of ideas taking the Afrikaner
 historical experience as its point of departure and projecting that
 onto other peoples in the country. Just as the Afrikaners had
 thrown off British cultural hegemony, so the black people, accord
 ing to the ideology, had to realize their own separate ethnic iden
 tity and build up their own ethnic power base. Apartheid, how
 ever, was not the rationale or the end of the system of rule.
 Already in the late 1960s John Vorster, who had become prime
 minister in 1966, said that apartheid was merely the means by
 which an Afrikaner identity could be retained, maintained, and be
 kept "immortal" within a white sovereign state. He added: "If
 there were better means to achieve the same end they had to be
 found."31 This was an approach to which all his successors sub
 scribed.
 Until the final decade of its rule the NP leadership continued to
 believe that conceptually apartheid was an ethically justifiable
 system that enabled all the "nations" in South Africa to survive.
 However, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the contra
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 diction between the ideal and the harsh reality, consisting as it did
 of black "homelands" that economically were not viable, the
 annual arrest of hundreds of thousands of pass-law offenders
 seeking work in the cities, the prosecution of those who trans
 gressed the racial sex laws, and so on. Whereas the apartheid
 system in the 1950s and 1960s almost unthinkingly exploited an
 uneducated, poorly trained labor force, of whom a large comple
 ment were migrants, the realization dawned in the early 1970s
 that this super-exploitation was bad not only for economic growth
 but for future white security. In 1971 a cabinet minister warned
 about the huge racial wage gap, declaring that "such gigantic
 differences in living standards. . .would lead to murder and vio
 lence." After a wave of industrial strikes by extremely poorly paid
 black workers in 1973, Prime Minister John Vorster exhorted
 employers to treat blacks not "as labor units, but as human beings
 with souls." The government took the lead by narrowing the racial
 wage gap in the public sector, but vast inequities remained. The
 Soweto uprising imparted a greater urgency, particularly after
 P. W. Botha came to power in 1978. He told party followers: "We
 are moving into a changing world. We must adapt, otherwise we
 shall die." He also urged them to learn the lessons of their own
 history: "the moment you start oppressing people. . .they fight
 back. We must acknowledge people's rights and. . .make ourselves
 free by giving to others in a spirit of justice what we demand for
 ourselves."32
 At the same time the leadership gave the assurance that white
 security remained of paramount importance. The government claimed
 that the country was confronted with a "total onslaught," which
 assailed the entire sociopolitical order. According to government
 spokesmen, the overriding consideration was "survival." But there
 was no real moral basis for the Afrikaner and the larger white
 minority to appeal for support in their struggle. The harsh reality
 was that the world backed minorities only when they expressed
 moral and political principles that the outside world felt should
 not be suppressed. To the world the white minority embodied,
 above all, crass materialism. While smarting under this world, and
 particularly Western, condemnation, the NP had no intention of
 giving up power as they entered the 1980s. However, fatal sys
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 temic weaknesses persuaded a new leadership to find a different
 solution to the crisis.33
 THE UNDERMINING OF A SYSTEM
 While obnoxious to the world, the system of Afrikaner domina
 tion was quite stable at the beginning of the 1980s, resting as it did
 on three pillars: vastly superior state power, white unity, and
 black political fragmentation. Over the next decade this system
 disintegrated until it finally was abolished in the mid-1990s. The
 system was undermined on the one hand by long-term demo
 graphic and economic trends and on the other hand by swelling
 black resistance. This produced such ideological and political dis
 array in the Afrikaner leadership ranks that they decided to risk
 the unbanning of the liberation movements, followed by negotia
 tions for a power-sharing system. A lack of any strategic vision on
 the leadership's part, coupled with tough bargaining by the Afri
 can National Congress negotiators, produced the outcome very
 few had expected and many feared: largely untrammeled majority
 rule in a unitary state.
 The changing demographic equation, and more specifically the
 rapidly shrinking white minority, distinguishes the South African
 conflict most strikingly from all other ethnic conflicts. Seen against
 the broad sweep of South Africa's history, one of a handful of
 really important facts is that until the mid-twentieth century the
 proportion of whites relative to the total population was always
 sufficient to occupy all the strategic positions in the political,
 economic, and administrative systems in the country. Unlike, say,
 the colonizers in the northeastern parts of colonial Brazil, whites
 in South Africa never needed to establish a free, semi-skilled mu
 latto class to occupy the intermediate positions in the system of
 domination. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, a
 vital change had begun to make itself felt. Between 1910 and 1960
 whites constituted 20 percent of the total population, but by 1960
 the white demographic base began to shrink. By 1985 the white
 segment had fallen to 15 percent, and it is projected to fall to 11
 percent by 2010. An acute shortage of white manpower began to
 develop in both the public and private sectors. This shortage
 increasingly forced employers in the private sector to breach the
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 industrial color bar to meet the need for skilled and semi-skilled
 manpower. The state had overreached itself in both spending and
 administrative capacities in trying to control blacks. The mam
 moth Department of Bantu Administration and Development found
 itself incapable of stemming the flow of blacks to the cities. "Vot
 ing with their feet," urbanizing blacks brought about a "silent
 revolution." While blacks accounted for only half of all the city
 dwellers in the mid-1980s, they were projected to outnumber all
 other groups three to one by 2000. Blacks became homeowners
 and entrepreneurs and started to dominate vital segments of con
 sumer spending.34
 South Africa's economy began to stagnate in the mid-1970s
 after fifty years of impressively growing at about 5 percent per
 year. Between 1975 and 1991 the annual rate of growth fell to
 only 1.6 percent, well below the 3 percent annual population
 increase.35 Real per capita income in the period slumped by about
 25 percent. Some of the decline in the growth rate was due to
 factors over which the state had little control, such as the rise in
 energy prices after 1973 and the weaker market for South African
 commodities. Behind the country's economic woes, however, there
 also lay a long story of economic mismanagement. Ironically, the
 economic malaise sprang mostly from the determination to make
 white South Africa economically self-sufficient and capable of
 repulsing any threat to its political autonomy. South Africa could
 afford to do so since its economy was largely built around gold,
 which was assured of a market, albeit at a fixed price until the
 early 1970s. There was, however, a serious downside. First, gold is
 a finite and declining resource. As the mining industry was forced
 to increase wages in the early 1970s, its share of the Western
 world's gold production began to decline steadily. Secondly, the
 white demand for security, coupled with the luxury of having gold
 as a major export earner, produced a quite uncompetitive manu
 facturing sector. The drive towards import-substitution dates back
 to the 1920s, when the government started to build high tariff
 walls and established the Iron and Steel Corporation. Little effort
 went into becoming efficient enough to export. By the early 1990s
 manufacturing exports per capita were lower than any upper
 middle-income country except Brazil.
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 The state also introduced other policies designed to make the
 ruling group invulnerable. After World War II massive plants to
 extract oil from coal were built as part of a plan to bring the
 country's oil production up to one half of its domestic require
 ments. State aid to agriculture by 1970 provided on average one
 fifth of a white farmer's income. To prevent the black migration to
 the cities, the state put numerous obstacles in the way of black
 employment, with the result that production became increasingly
 capital intensive and labor saving?this in a country with abun
 dant sources of labor. To placate white workers, the training of
 blacks for more skilled work was a low priority. Labor productiv
 ity stopped growing in 1980 and capital productivity declined by
 over 30 percent between 1970 and 1991. Employment in the
 private sector dropped by forty-seven thousand jobs during the
 1980s. By 1990 fewer than ten out of one hundred new entrants
 could find work in the job market of the formal sector of the
 economy. Between a quarter and a third of the economically active
 black labor force could not find regular employment. This greatly
 aggravated the incidence of both political violence and crime.
 The economy had already started to shed black labor in the
 early 1970s. Realizing the security threat this posed, the govern
 ment made two fateful decisions in order to promote economic
 growth. The first was to expand greatly the provision of black
 education and, with that, the productivity of black labor. In 1960
 there were only 717 blacks in the most advanced classes in school.
 By the mid-1980s there were just over fifty thousand black and
 fifty thousand white university matriculants, but by 2000 it is
 predicted that seven out of ten matriculants will be black. By the
 end of the 1980s the urban black population was far better edu
 cated and trained?and much more radicalized than before. Sur
 veys consistently showed that the higher the level of education of
 blacks the more acute their political discontent and the more
 pressing their demands. It was schoolchildren and students with
 little hope of finding acceptable jobs who spearheaded the success
 ful ANC-led efforts of the 1980s to disrupt the black educational
 system and make the black townships ungovernable.
 The other fateful decision was in 1979 when the government
 scrapped statutory job reservation and all other impediments to
 the advancement and training of black workers. It also allowed
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 black trade unions to participate in the statutory industrial rela
 tions system. Blacks now enjoyed effective industrial civil rights
 without any meaningful political rights. The government's expec
 tation that the black trade union movement would not become
 politicized quickly proved to be quite misguided. In fact, it became
 the best organized part of the liberation movement, arranging
 strikes and "rolling mass action" at critical points to back up
 black demands and weaken the will of NP negotiators. In an effort
 by employers to buy off militant black workers, wage increases
 were granted, but they were unaccompanied by any commensu
 rate improvement in productivity. The labor market became ever
 more rigid, worsening the unemployment crisis. Confronted with
 such a hostile environment, investors took fright. Gross fixed
 investment plummeted from 26 percent of the GDP in 1983 to 16
 percent in 1991?a level at which it was impossible for the economy
 to grow, since a 14 percent level was needed simply to replace the
 capital equipment that was wearing out. At the same time govern
 ment consumer spending rose sharply from 15 to 21 percent. This
 was partly the result of an effort to mollify white civil servants but
 also in order to provide services to the rapidly growing black
 population and to narrow racial pay differentials. To fund this
 increased spending the government heavily taxed the middle and
 upper income sectors and borrowed so much that its debt rose
 from 5 to 19 percent of the budget between 1975 and 1992.
 The NP government realized that the country needed a more
 legitimate political framework in order to attract new investments.
 Taking the first step in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising, it
 started a process leading in 1984 to the incorporation of the
 colored and Indian groups, forming 8 and 3 percent of the popu
 lation respectively, into a Tricameral Parliament. Although the
 "other two" chambers had little power, the new Parliament irre
 vocably undermined the symbolism of white supremacy. Unex
 pectedly it also materially contributed to the destruction of two of
 the three pillars of the Afrikaners' power: their own unity and
 black political fragmentation.
 Afrikaner political unity was finally shattered when the Conser
 vative Party (CP) was founded in 1982 after eighteen parliamen
 tary representatives of the NP had broken away over the issue of
 "power-sharing" with Coloreds and Indians. It managed to win
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 over 40 to 50 percent of the Afrikaners in the next ten years.
 Although there were class dimensions to the split, with the CP
 based more strongly on lower income Afrikaners than the NP, the
 real line of division concerned the different ways of securing Afrikaner
 political survival. The split ended the life of the NP as a purely
 ethnic party. Government policy was no longer the tortuous out
 come of several battles fought on different sites in the nationalist
 movement. The party had become a catchall (white) party, with
 the votes of English-speakers constituting more than 42 percent of
 its support in the 1987 election. The political leadership increas
 ingly assumed a vanguard role. There was a major reduction of
 accountability as the NP parliamentary caucus was marginalized
 with leaders strengthening technocratic forms of decision-making.
 No longer constrained in the same way by the checks on power a
 nationalist movement traditionally imposes on its leadership, the
 NP leaders began to resemble free-floating political entrepreneurs,
 guided less by loyalty to the ethnic cause than by calculations
 about their place in the future centers of power. F. W. de Klerk
 and his future chief negotiator, Roelf Meyer, who as ethnic politi
 cians strongly opposed reforms of the apartheid order (de Klerk
 did so until 1987), would as negotiators be more willing to retreat
 in the face of ANC demands than their NP colleagues, who earlier
 had been considered much more liberal.
 The state had turned into a multiracial state that relied on
 racially mixed security forces to impose order and on black home
 land leaders like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to counter the ANC-led
 movement to isolate South Africa economically and internation
 ally. The NP now rested on a broader base, but it had lost almost
 all ideological cohesion. In two polls, one undertaken in 1977 and
 the other in 1992, Afrikaners were asked to give a rating of what
 they considered to be the most important policy of their party. The
 responses were largely identical; at 27 percent in both polls white
 security was the highest priority, while language and culture rated
 seventh in 1977 at 1 percent. Fifteen years later it was eighth at 3
 percent. One could argue that language and culture were so well
 protected that there was little reason to be worried, but the result
 still is a remarkable testimony to the waning of specifically Afri
 kaans cultural concerns during the apartheid era.36 The dream of
 an exclusive white land had vanished as streams of impoverished
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 blacks flowed to the outskirts of the cities and trickled into the
 white suburbs, raising fears about a collapse of "First World"
 standards. White voters were persuaded that the old order of black
 exclusion from power finally had come to an end. They were
 prepared to accept blacks in government provided a new political
 order guaranteed security, predictable politicians, competent bu
 reaucrats, a strong economy, and secure property rights. Afrikaners
 and the larger white community still strongly insisted on what
 Walker Connor calls the freedom from domination by nonmem
 bers, which in practical terms meant separate white political rep
 resentation and a white veto. In Africa, however, that constituted
 white privilege and that was what the ANC's struggle was about.
 Such had been the outrage of blacks over their exclusion from
 the Tricameral Parliament that another pillar of white power,
 namely the lack of black unity, had disappeared. All government
 efforts to attract moderate black leaders with demonstrable sup
 port into talks about drafting a new constitution failed. For the
 first time in a century sufficient black unity existed in the greatest
 part of the country to prevent the government from using black
 moderates as a shield in a form of indirect rule. The uprising of
 1984-1986 all but eliminated the credibility of black councilors
 elected in the 1980s to run the black townships, none of which
 had a proper revenue base. Reluctant to devolve any power to the
 Natal region for fear of losing control, the government by the mid
 1980s had alienated Chief Buthelezi, the only internal leader with
 a mass base. Except in rural Natal, where Buthelezi held sway, the
 ANC or its proxies were able to prevent any black movement not
 under its control from becoming a significant force. The state had
 established a large degree of control by the end of 1986, but it had
 become clear that the popular resistance could not be crushed
 altogether. At the end of the 1980s the security forces had begun
 to give up on winning the hearts-and-minds battle. Mike Louw,
 who was a senior officer in the National Intelligence Service (he
 became its head in 1992), remembers the situation in the late
 1980s as follows: "Nowhere was the situation out of hand, but it
 was clear that politically and morally we were losing. Everywhere
 in the black townships we encountered intimidation and a strong
 political consciousness. The political system had become obsolete
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 and a long, bloody struggle lay ahead. It had become clear that the
 sooner we negotiated a new system the better."37
 In a perceptive article on South Africa, published in 1981,
 Samuel Huntington made the point that revolutionary violence
 does not have to be successful to be effective. It simply has to
 create sufficient trouble in the dominant group about ways to deal
 with it. Once the leadership is no longer able to apply its instru
 ments of coercion ruthlessly, a crucial pillar of the system of
 domination disintegrates.38 This was what started to happen by
 the second half of the 1980s. The government's inability to find a
 moderate black leadership with whom to negotiate had produced
 a deadlock in government. An account of the meeting of a special
 cabinet committee held in March 1986 shows how fundamental
 the differences in the power elite were. President Botha remarked
 that he did not favor one man, one vote in a unitary or federal
 state, adding: "I thought. . .we had clarity, but I do not think we
 have it anymore, because you want me to say we stand for a
 unitary South Africa. You allow me to say it, you write it in my
 speeches and I accept it, but what do we mean by that?" F. W. de
 Klerk commented that he could live with a rotating presidency,
 but "somewhere there must be somebody who had enough power
 in his hands, somewhere in a good government there must be a
 P. W. Botha who had the power and authority to ensure that
 things went right in the country."39 As will be seen, de Klerk's
 hope that there would be white representation in a mixed cabinet,
 underpinned by some formal form of power, became his main
 negotiating goal in the early 1990s.
 The Afrikaner elite recognized that remaining at an impasse was
 also dangerous. In mid-1986 the Afrikaner Broederbond, the se
 cret communication channel between the government and the
 elite, issued a circular to that effect entitled "Political Values for
 the Survival of the Afrikaner." It declared that "the greatest risk
 that we are taking today is not taking any risks." The abolition of
 statutory discrimination had become a "prerequisite for survival"
 while black exclusion from politics "had become a threat to sur
 vival." It concluded that the state president did not have to be
 white and that ultimately the future of the Afrikaners depended on
 their will to survive and their faith and energy.40 Also in 1986, the
 Dutch Reformed Church, by far the largest of the Afrikaner churches,
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 finally abandoned its support for apartheid as a system that it had
 long justified theologically. It decided to follow the New rather
 than the Old Testament, pointing out that the idea of race plays no
 part whatsoever in the New Testament while the idea of the
 diversity of peoples is always presented within the context of
 unity. The church also abandoned some other cherished ideas:
 that it was as one with the Afrikaner people, that it was the moral
 conscience of the Volk and state, and that the Scriptures presented
 any specific model for race relations. For the first time it specifi
 cally stated that racism was a sin. Implicitly this meant that the
 vaunting of any group was racism and hence a sin. Afrikaners
 could no longer think of themselves as a chosen people; the idea of
 the covenant was dead.41
 TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC UNCERTAINTY
 While ethnic groups only relinquish power in exceptional circum
 stances, they almost always seek allies. This is particularly true of
 the Afrikaners, a small and basically insecure group. The apartheid
 system, which appropriated a monopoly of power, was something
 of an anomaly in Afrikaner history: The more than three centuries
 of settlement are studded with totally unexpected Afrikaner alli
 ances or proposed alliances with unlikely partners ranging from
 African chiefs to imperialists to socialists. When the government
 confronted the deep impasse in the white-black power struggle at
 the end of the 1980s, it knew its constituency would welcome any
 major black partner that could assist it in dealing with the intrac
 table problems of massive black poverty, unemployment, and crime.
 The dominant political question now had become not whether to
 take a black party into government?to that all except the right
 wing agreed?but whether the ANC constituted such a partner.
 A more important question, however, was whether this black
 white cooperation should occur in a democratic context. Some
 analysts argued in the mid-1980s that the introduction of univer
 sal franchise had become possible because little cultural distance
 characterized white-black relations. They largely shared the Chris
 tian religion and had become economically interdependent.42 Roelf
 Meyer, the chief NP negotiator in the latter half of the negotia
 tions, endorsed this view when visiting Belfast in mid-1996 with
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 his ANC counterpart, Cyril Ramaphosa. Meyer indicated that he
 believed it to be wrong to compare the South African experience
 to that of Northern Ireland because "we [in South Africa] basically
 had no fundamental differences to resolve." He continued, "It was
 almost as simple as a matter of color or race that separated us. We
 had to remove the problem to reach out to each other, and to
 discover each other as human beings."43
 Meyer's reference to the "simple matter" of race and color that
 separated whites and blacks can be seen as a collapse of both the
 ideology of apartheid and of Afrikaner ethnonationalism and the
 historic and political claims and status associations attached to
 that. This statement can be read as a testimony to the unqualified
 ideological victory of the anti-apartheid movement worldwide and
 of modernization theory, which postulates the eradication of eth
 nic and racial differences within a common society. There was one
 problem: it was not shared by the constituency that Meyer and his
 party represented. In successive polls in the final years of the
 1980s, only a third of whites agreed that whites and Africans had
 enough common values to create a future democratic government.
 After the ANC's unbanning the figure increased and reached 59
 percent in mid-1992, but after a series of attacks on whites it
 dropped again to a third by the end of 1992. Once questions
 became more specific dramatic differences were revealed. In a
 1992 poll the following statement was made: "South Africa is an
 African country where others have to take second place." Of
 blacks 56 percent agreed with this statement against only 5 per
 cent of whites. In a 1986 poll only 3 percent of Afrikaners (and 8
 percent of English-speakers) were prepared to accept a unitary
 state with one parliament and one vote for every person.44
 In such a context the government was increasingly attracted to
 the paradigm of consociationalism or power-sharing as an alterna
 tive to the Westminster form of majority rule. It had billed the
 Tricameral Parliament (incorrectly) as power-sharing, and its con
 stituency considered that nonthreatening. Why not try it with
 blacks? In discussions between 1971 and 1990 with NP politi
 cians, Arend Lijphart, the internationally renowned proponent of
 consociationalism, argued that they were making a big mistake if
 they thought that their choice was between a broad sharing of
 power and exclusive white (and Afrikaner) power. He told them
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 their only real choice was between sharing power and losing power.45
 In the end they accepted this argument, strongly believing that
 negotiations did not entail bargaining over only the transfer of
 power.
 There were several factors that facilitated the pursuit of a power
 sharing settlement with the ANC. First there was Nelson Mandela,
 then still in jail and having informal, secret talks with government
 officials. Almost without exception NP leaders considered him a
 "godsend," a man whose stature and integrity they immediately
 recognized. He was no moderate in NP terms but consistently
 argued that majority rule, which he considered non-negotiable,
 had to be balanced by guarantees that ensured that white domina
 tion would not be replaced by black domination. Second, de Klerk
 was a democrat and civilian politician. He viewed with distaste the
 sidelining of the cabinet under the state of emergency, which saw
 the State Security Council, comprised of politicians and security
 officials, making the most important decisions. When de Klerk
 assumed control in 1989 he was assured of conservative backing
 in the party caucus, but the reformists were suspicious of him.
 Polls showed that the NP's support among white voters was being
 seriously eroded on both the Left and the Right while it remained
 paralyzed about its future direction. De Klerk had no wish for
 security officials to be further involved in political decisions. That
 meant he had only one option for shoring up his base: he had to
 seek a political solution, which meant that he had to move to the
 Left. Since the party fought for the election in 1989 on the premise
 that the polling constituted the last one from which blacks were
 excluded, he had no more than five years to find that solution.
 Third, whites had enjoyed the franchise in South Africa for
 nearly 150 years, and there was little prospect of them supporting
 a solution in which they had to sacrifice their democratic rights.
 An important comparative article recently argued that the consoli
 dation of a democracy in Africa occurred in settler societies be
 cause there had been a tradition of electoral competition, unlike
 patrimonial regimes where competition previously had been out
 lawed.46 Of course the settlers long blocked the extension of de
 mocracy or used a partial extension to thwart popular democracy.
 When the NP in the early 1980s incorporated the colored people
 and Indians in the democratic process, its chief propagandist pri
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 vately presented it as " [broadening] our own power base and thus
 avoid turning them [Coloreds] over to a black power situation."47
 It was only when the leadership in the late 1980s was confronted
 with a stark choice between extending democracy to blacks and a
 costly battle of attrition that the democratic tradition of whites
 became an important variable. Having made the choice for democ
 racy, the leadership could claim that black enfranchisement was
 not a break or denial of history but actually in line with the
 political tradition of whites and their interests. Gerrit Viljoen,
 initially the government's chief negotiator, defended a negotiated
 democracy as indispensable for the survival of whites as a shrink
 ing minority. He said in early 1990: "[We] who want change want
 it exactly because we realize that our survival depends on orderly
 change. . .. The whole approach of government is to shift the
 emphasis from race to the quality of government and the broaden
 ing of democracy in spite of the risks."48
 The fall of the Berlin Wall two months after de Klerk became
 State President presented the NP with a large window of opportu
 nity. De Klerk could now tell his constituency that without Soviet
 backing the ANC was no longer a threat. With the entire world
 moving away from the socialist experiment the ANC would be
 forced to respect private property and follow other investment
 friendly policies. De Klerk began to use to great effect the argu
 ment that time would not be on the side of whites, and Afrikaners
 in particular. He argued that the settlement Ian Smith and the
 white Rhodesians were forced to accept constituted a classic case
 of negotiations that had been delayed too long. Two months after
 his February 2, 1990 speech, he declared to a meeting held in the
 offices of Die Burger: "We have not waited until the position of
 power dominance turned against us before we decided to negotiate
 a peaceful settlement. The initiative is in our hands. We have the
 means to ensure that the process develops peacefully and in an
 orderly way."49 In the period that followed, de Klerk and his
 senior ministers consistently spelled out the message that whites
 had a stark choice between being driven back into a corner in the
 next ten years or staging an outflanking movement that could
 yield to them and their representatives a strategic position in a
 new, legitimate political system.
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 The NP entered the negotiations in 1990 from a position of
 strength and with a reasonably confident assumption that it could
 engineer a constitution that would severely restrict the power of
 the majority and thus diminish democratic uncertainty. Its negoti
 ating proposals made a provision for a rotating presidency as the
 kingpin of an intricate scheme that would carefully limit the power
 of the majority and that of the minority (or minorities). The NP
 ended the negotiations in 1996, having failed to secure any of its
 major political and cultural objectives. Instead of nonelected nego
 tiating parties drawing up the constitution over a prolonged pe
 riod of time (as the NP proposed), an elected constituent assembly
 did so (as was the ANC's position). Instead of a power-sharing
 cabinet and rotating presidency within a federal system (NP) there
 would be a largely unitary state and majority decision-making in
 both the executive and legislative branches. These branches would
 effectively be fused and dominated by the largest party in the
 typical Westminster style (ANC). Drawing more than 80 percent
 of the black vote in the 1994 election, the ANC is assured to
 remain the dominant party for quite some time. Economically the
 NP got its way when the ANC accepted the market system and
 property rights, but in cultural affairs it has little reason for satis
 faction. The recognition of eleven languages looks like a barely
 concealed formula for English to become the sole official lan
 guage, and the ANC refused to grant either mother-tongue educa
 tion or single-medium schools as rights. The cultural autonomy of
 Afrikaans schools and universities is heavily qualified by the insis
 tence that English streams be introduced in these institutions to
 provide greater access to blacks.
 We are left with two main questions: Why did the NP concede
 so much in the negotiations, ending up not with power-sharing but
 with majority rule? Why did its white constituency accept majority
 rule, which more than 90 percent firmly rejected in polls taken in
 the late 1980s?
 The following explanations seem plausible. First, apartheid had
 used or debased all the available capital that normally goes with
 the demands ethnonational minorities make to ensure their sur
 vival. In the negotiations the NP was unable to argue convincingly
 that the Afrikaners or the larger white group as a whole consti
 tuted a minority rather than a replaced dominant group. It was
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 impossible to demand that the NP as a white party be given a veto
 and at the same time pretend that it had made a decisive break
 with apartheid, which, by its own admission, had failed. The NP
 could make no territorial or federal claims since Afrikaners lived
 dispersed all over the country and since neither they nor the larger
 white group commanded a majority in any region. The formal
 acceptance of "Western standards" across racial lines made it
 impossible for the NP to argue that there were unique cultural
 values that had to be specially protected.
 As a result of all this the NP decided to pursue a nonracial
 position and make the party the articulator of values and interests.
 Apart from its traditional middle-class white base, the NP also
 attracted lower-income colored people, middle-class Indians, and
 a small section of conservative blacks across the class spectrum. It
 also claimed to be the representative of the specific interests of
 business, civil servants, and the security forces. All this strength
 ened the ANC's argument that the country's politics was about
 interests and not race, making an "ordinary" (Mandela's word)
 liberal democracy feasible. To counter this the NP had to make the
 obvious point that the comparative evidence showed that in deeply
 divided societies there is normally no significant floating vote,
 which gives liberal democracies their vitality. Instead, race and
 ethnic affinities decisively determine voters' preferences. Hence,
 power-sharing was necessary to avoid the alienation of minorities
 and to provide a safe basis for investment. But the NP was unable
 to stand up to the ANC position that race and ethnicity had been
 tainted by apartheid and that no formal recognition should be
 given to these identities.
 Secondly, the ANC retreat from nationalization as a main plank
 of its platform made it more difficult for the NP to claim that its
 presence in government was indispensable for the protection of
 free enterprise. The NP had come to the free market position very
 late in the day, and the very state of the economy testified to its
 violation of some cardinal principles of neo-liberal economic man
 agement. There was a huge debt, the civil service was bloated, the
 tariff walls were high, and corruption and white collar crime were
 rife. Apart from de Klerk and one or two others, the top echelons
 of the NP were far from impressive as politicians outside their
 traditional Afrikaner context. It was difficult to make the argu
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 ment that the NP added much value to the governing process or
 that its administrative talents were indispensable.
 Thirdly, the end of the Cold War weakened the NP position.
 There was now no reason for the West to back a conservative
 government. Mandela's stature and the ANC's long struggle for
 black liberation made it seem the natural successor to the NP. The
 US government started leaning towards the view that as long as
 the ANC subscribed to a market system its political demands
 could be considered reasonable. At a critical point in the negotia
 tions the US Under Secretary of State for African Affairs declared
 that all sides had to recognize "the right of the majority to gov
 ern." No side could insist on "overly complex arrangements in
 tended to guarantee a share of power to particular groups which
 will frustrate effective government. Minorities have the right to
 safeguards; they cannot expect a veto."50 The ANC itself could not
 have formulated it better.
 Finally?and there is no other word for it?de Klerk lacked the
 necessary toughness to face down the ANC on critical points to
 ensure that his bottom-line demands were met. His great strength
 as a debater was also his weakness: He believed that he could
 persuade everyone of the reasonableness of his case or that some
 legalistic formula could always be found to paper over irreconcil
 able differences. When the ANC broke off negotiations in mid
 1992 to embark on two months of rolling mass action, he was
 unable to sit this out. He believed that any security clampdown
 would destroy the chances of the remaining sanctions being lifted
 soon. He also thought that there was a risk of an economic
 meltdown if there was a refusal to resume negotiations on the part
 of the ANC leadership, who had endured long periods in jail or
 had lived on low salaries in exile and might be prepared to con
 tinue to do so to clinch victory. Only by sitting out the difficult
 period between July and September 1992 could de Klerk test the
 ANC leadership's resolve. However, as a man who in white poli
 tics was known as essentially a peacemaker and a centrist, he
 lacked the will to do so. In the end de Klerk set no conditions for
 a resumption of the negotiations and met almost all the ANC
 demands. The ANC had seized the upper hand. With increasing
 confidence Mandela rejected de Klerk's demands for formal power
 sharing in the cabinet, treating it as an attempt to cling to the
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 vestiges of white power. All de Klerk could get was Mandela's
 verbal assurance that he needed him and that he had a role to play.
 That, however, was subordinate to Mandela's insistence on having
 the power to make the final decisions. The final deal was so far
 from the NP's original demands that when the cabinet met to
 ratify it an outraged minister shouted at de Klerk: "What have
 you done?! You have given South Africa away!!"51
 The NP was now squarely confronted with majority rule, pre
 cisely what it had promised its constituency it would prevent. De
 Klerk still hoped to retain more than a marginal influence by a
 good NP performance in the election. When the NP received 20
 percent of the vote instead of the 30 to 35 percent de Klerk had
 expected, the hope of influence based on electoral strength was
 dashed. The other hope was that the NP would exert influence by
 acting as the gatekeeper to three powerful sectors: the business
 community, civil servants, and the security forces. But all three
 had given up on the NP as it began to backtrack in the negotia
 tions and as the ANC moved swiftly to give assurances. Civil
 servants were promised their jobs or satisfactory retirement pack
 ages; the security forces were promised amnesty instead of a repeat
 of the Nuremberg trials; and the business community was assured
 that the new government considered private-sector investment as a
 top priority. Business quickly decided that a dominant party that
 comes to power through an election, tolerates an opposition, and
 respects civil rights constituted a sound platform for stability.
 The puzzle remains: why did whites not revolt against a deal or
 overthrow de Klerk, given their resistance to majority rule? De
 Klerk as the scion of a political family and former conservative
 enjoyed an extraordinary measure of trust. No member of the
 caucus could ever believe that he would betray that trust or his
 people. Every time resistance surfaced in caucus he argued that,
 short of security action, no alternatives existed. He could assure all
 the members of his caucus, of whom a great majority were profes
 sional politicians, that there was an excellent chance that they
 would continue their political careers in the new structures. He
 dealt with the white electorate by holding an all-white referendum
 asking only for an endorsement of the negotiations well before
 serious negotiations started. As details of the unthinkable emerged,
 whites were gripped by a mood of resignation. The dismantling of
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 the apartheid system had started in the early 1970s, and every time
 the electorate quickly adjusted to the new situation. This time, it
 was true, the matter was far more serious, but after almost seventy
 years of depending on an interventionist state, no white class?
 whether it be business, workers, or civil servants?had retained the
 capacity to organize separately to challenge the political leader
 ship.
 The military formed a possible source of resistance. However, it
 was small (fewer than seventy thousand full-time soldiers, of whom
 half were non white) and had a long tradition of subservience to
 the political leadership. Moreover, de Klerk, probably sensing
 trouble, refused ANC demands for a multiparty aggregation of the
 security forces and carried out a small purge of officers suspected
 of backing or instigating third force activities. General Constand
 Viljoen, a widely respected former head of the Defense Force, at
 one stage threatened to mobilize right-wing forces of resistance
 and seize sufficient land to carve out a future Afrikaner Volkstaat.
 The undisciplined conduct of right-wing paramilitary organiza
 tions made effective action impossible. Viljoen and his movement
 were drawn into the election by a promise that the new govern
 ment would consider a Volkstaat and would appoint a Volkstaat
 council comprised of right-wingers to research and deliberate on
 such a plan.
 Election day was peaceful. Afrikaners were split almost down
 the middle between the right-wing parties and the NP. Ironically,
 the NP's electoral support base was much more nonracial than the
 ANC's. It drew half its votes from people who were not white,
 while only 6 percent of the ANC's support was not black. But the
 most important fact was that power had passed to blacks. Afrikaners
 with cultural concerns now had to fend for themselves under a
 new dominant party that did not have much patience for subnational
 identities or anything but an increasingly English-based, individu
 alistic culture.
 CONCLUSION
 It would be tempting, though wrong, to consider what happened
 to the Afrikaners as evidence for the assumption that the emo
 tional power of ethnicity is exaggerated and that material interests
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 are decisive when the chips are down.52 The situation was excep
 tional in South Africa in that the small, shrinking Afrikaner minor
 ity was facing severe economic and political problems and was
 hopelessly overextended in the political and administrative system.
 It had to make tough decisions about their future political survival
 as a group. De Klerk made his decisions in the spirit of Edmund
 Burke's dictum that leaders have to take their followers not where
 they want but ought to be. He knew that a shrinking white
 minority clinging to a monopoly of power offered no guarantee
 for the survival of his people. He was also confident that he could
 convince the ANC than an effective ANC-NP coalition was the
 best platform for realizing the economic potential of South Africa.
 De Klerk was able to persuade his party, his constituency, and the
 security forces to give up exclusive power and accept a new vision.
 Where de Klerk failed was in his management of the negotiating
 process and in his strategy towards realizing his goal of power
 sharing or of achieving an effective coalition government. He
 never signaled to the ANC in any serious way that this was his
 bottom line, nor did he try to understand the ANC's real agenda
 behind the bland assurances the movement's negotiators offered
 him that the ANC would continue to consult and work with de
 Klerk and his party. The ANC succeeded in getting what its
 spokespeople called an ordinary system of majority rule by flatly
 refusing to have the principle of power-sharing written into the
 constitution. It did approve, however, of a vaguely worded provi
 sion for a Government of National Unity in the interim constitu
 tion to assuage white voters' fears. Once the ANC had settled in
 the cushions of power, it was confident that the NP had no real
 power to constrain it. It rejected the inclusion of any sort of
 government of national unity in the final constitution, which came
 into force on February 4, 1997. Three weeks earlier de Klerk
 stated:
 The decision to surrender the right to national sovereignty is cer
 tainly one of the most painful that any leader can ever be asked to
 take. Most nations are prepared to risk total war and catastrophe
 rather than to surrender this right. Yet this was the decision that we
 had to take. We had to accept the necessity of giving up the ideal on
 which we have been nurtured and the dream for which so many
 generations of our forefathers had struggled and for which so many
 of our people had died.53
This content downloaded from 196.42.99.24 on Wed, 20 Sep 2017 08:52:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Afrikaners and the South African "Miracle" 143
 The Afrikaner leadership handed over power because it had mis
 calculated that it was indispensable to the ANC.
 Whites did not mount much resistance once the prospect of
 majority rule began to take shape. Part of the reason was that the
 process remained shrouded in ambiguity for quite some time. But
 there were also deep-seated reasons. There was little that a people
 in a modern state could do to roll back the process, and this is
 particularly true if they are as outnumbered as whites in South
 Africa were. Moreover, whites had become convinced of the fail
 ure of apartheid in the 1980s and saw no easy alternative. The
 electoral link between the NP and the white constituency had
 effectively been removed in 1989, well before the start of the
 negotiations. Constitutionally there was no course of action avail
 able to resist de Klerk. All that those who were prepared to take
 arms could do was to embark on random terrorism; alternatively,
 they could contemplate establishing by force an ethnic state in one
 of the regions. But for most whites that held little attraction.
 Had someone other than de Klerk been elected as leader in 1989
 a prolonged stalemate could have ensued, or South Africa may
 have witnessed a different leader pursuing a different strategy with
 a different outcome. If the particular events that did unfold dem
 onstrate anything, it is that leaders do make a difference, particu
 larly if they have the ability to take the party and their people with
 them into uncharted territory. What makes de Klerk different
 from a Gorbachev is that he is still the leader of his party and has
 managed to retain a following and a considerable degree of respect
 despite failing in his high-risk gamble. It says much for de Klerk,
 but even more about the Afrikaner people?their pragmatism,
 their fatalism, and perhaps also their resilience.
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